Well well, here we are discussing the space shuttle again.
Remember all the solutions discussed here after the accident?
One was followed, careful photographic examination of the launch to catch any problems.
But apparently the other suggestion to add fiber to the foam (kevlar of course would be the choice), was not followed.
In fact this was the case!
Among other things, it improved the training processes for applying foam by hand. At the Michoud tank assembly plant in Louisiana, an observer monitors every worker spraying foam - "for every sprayer there's a watcher, a second pair of eyes," said June Malone, a NASA spokeswoman.
But the tank that flew with the Discovery last week was made before the new procedures went into effect, and NASA stopped short of requiring that the ramps be redone, said a spokesman, Martin J. Jensen.
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/31/science/space/3 [...]
So NO improvement at all was done to the foam!! They flew with tank insulation applied before the new procedure "... improved the training processes for applying foam by hand", identical to the foam that killed the previous crew? Why?
"Foam really is complicated," said Douglas D. Osheroff, a professor of physics at Stanford and a member of the board that investigated the Columbia accident. "Once you go supersonic, the top surface melts, the bottom surface is brittle as all hell because it's very cold, and you've got everything in between."
Although the material could be made less fragile by adding fibers to the foam, he noted, "that adds weight" to the shuttle.
So the weight argument trumped the safety issue? Why not save weight in other areas?
And finally this.
"I think they tried to find the solution within their own ranks, using what they're already familiar with," he said. "They should have looked at more options," perhaps including different formulations of foam that might be more flexible. But that would go against a fundamental tenet of engineering. As Michael D. Griffin, NASA's new administrator and an engineer himself, said Friday, engineers believe "If it ain't broke, don't fix it."
"We debated and discussed whether the PAL ramp was broke" in the months that followed the Columbia disaster, Dr. Griffin continued. "The conclusion we came to was the wrong one, but the conclusion we came to after considerable study was that it was better to fly as is."
"If it ain't broke, don't fix it." But the ramp was not "broke", the foam coating was "broke".
And it was not fixed, or tested until failure as is the rule with aircraft engineering.
The people who made the decision not to fix the foam and test it need to be retired with extreme prejudice. And replaced by folks like this..
A NASA engineer who works on tank safety issues said other areas of foam shedding from the Discovery's tank were even more troubling than the PAL ramp loss - especially a divot that popped from the vicinity of the left-hand bipod strut, the spot that shed the foam that brought down Columbia.
"We worked the hell out of that," said the engineer, who was given anonymity because he said disclosure of his name would jeopardize his career. The loss of foam from that spot after so much work to correct the problem, he went on, proves that the problem is still far more complex than NASA understands.
Another potential whistleblower that had to remain silent to protect his career. When will reform take hold? Will it ever?
This is the same story at every level of our culture. Remain silent or face mob justice.
